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Abstract
We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the
Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad
class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic
revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin
and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We
also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and eﬃciency, showing that
a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher-than-eﬃcient reservation
prices and higher-than-eﬃcient entry fees.
1 Introduction
Entry is a quantitatively and qualitatively important aspect of many real-world auction
processes, but theoretical analysis of auctions with entry has primarily been limited to a
few notable but restrictive special cases. Two paradigmatic examples in the literature are
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Samuelson (1985) (henceforth S), who proposes a simultaneous entry model in which poten-
tial bidders know their valuations ex ante but must incur a ﬁxed cost to submit bids, and
Levin and Smith (1994) (henceforth LS), who consider simultaneous entry under the alterna-
tive assumption that bidders learn their valuations after incurring the ﬁxed cost. A common
theme in this literature is that diﬀerent assumptions on entry can produce very diﬀerent
practical and policy conclusions. For example, under the LS model a revenue-maximizing
seller will set a zero reserve price and maximize social welfare, whereas in the S model rev-
enue maximization requires a binding, socially ineﬃcient reserve price. Hence while the
existing literature contains many important insights on auctions with entry, it permits few
overarching theoretical and policy conclusions.
This paper seeks to generalize several core results on auctions with entry to a framework
we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. First suggested by Ye (2007) and subsequently
explored by Marmer et al. (2013), Roberts and Sweeting (2013), Gentry and Li (2014),
Bhattacharya and Sweeting (2015), and Lu and Ye (2015) among others, the AS model
assumes that potential bidders receive imperfect signals of their valuations prior to entry,
make simultaneous entry decisions based on these signals, then learn their valuations and
submit bids. This structure imposes minimal a priori restrictions on pre-entry information,
requiring only that higher signals lead bidders to expect stochastically higher post-entry
valuations. It nests the LS model as a special case when signals and values are independent,
and approaches the S model as the special case where values are determined by signals. The
AS model thus represents an ideal basis for a general analysis of auctions with entry.
Motivated by these considerations, we extend the standard independent private values
auction environment to accommodate endogenous and selective (AS) entry, focusing on a
class of mechanisms we call standard auctions with simultaneous entry in the sense of Bhat-
tacharya and Sweeting (2015).1 For this class of auctions, we establish the following three
1Roughly, this class of auctions consists of mechanisms such that only the highest bidder has a positive
probability of award, and the probability of award depends only on the highest bid. We borrow the label
standard auctions with simultaneous free entry from Bhattacharya and Sweeting (2015), who compare auc-
tions with free entry with a range of other mechanisms by which the seller might attempt to (explicitly or
2
results. First, we formally extend the classic revenue equivalence theorem of Myerson (1981),
Riley and Samuelson (1981), and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous
and selective (AS) entry. Second, we characterize the eﬃcient mechanism within the class
of standard auctions with free entry, and show that the seller’s revenue-maximizing auction
will be ineﬃcient in general. While Levin and Smith (1994) have long recognized that the
congruence between revenue maximization and eﬃciency would fail when asymmetry among
bidders or aﬃliated values are introduced, the latter result further clariﬁes the sense in which
this congruence depends pivotally on the “knife edge” informational assumption of LS en-
try. Finally, we explore optimal reservation prices and entry fees under AS entry, showing a
revenue-maximizing seller will typically prefer to set both positive in general.
This study builds on and extends a substantial literature on auctions with endogenous
entry. In addition to the studies cited above, notable early theoretical contributions to this
literature include McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Smith and Levin (1996); the former
explore a model of sequential entry where entry is interpreted as value discovery, the latter
show that entry can lead a second-price auction to revenue dominate a ﬁrst-price auction
even when bidders are risk averse. In more recent work, Lu (2010) and Moreno and Wooders
(2011) explore an extended version of the basic LS model in which bidders have private
entry costs. Lu characterizes equilibrium, eﬃciency, and optimal auction design in this
extended model, while Moreno and Wooders note that in the presence of private entry
costs a revenue-maximizing seller will no longer achieve eﬃciency if ex ante entry fees are
not allowed. Xu et al. (2013) study auctions with resale in a setting where bidders have
either high or low entry costs and know their valuations before entry, showing that resale
may introduce speculative motivations for entry, with ambiguous eﬀects on eﬃciency and
welfare. Finally, Bhattacharya and Sweeting (2015) explore the broader mechanism design
implications of endogenous and selective (AS) entry. Bhattacharya and Sweeting (2015) show
that the seller can often improve both revenue and eﬃciency by switching to one of several
implicitly) regulate entry. In Bhattacharya and Sweeting (2015), “free entry” means that potential bidders
simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to enter.
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mechanisms which regulate entry in ways not permitted by the class of standard auctions
with free entry. The current study complements these by providing a set of analytical results
on optimal revenue and eﬃciency within the class of standard auctions with free AS entry.
Although our analysis is primarily theoretical, our investigation is motivated by a sub-
stantial empirical literature on auctions with entry. Earlier work in this literature has estab-
lished the relevance of entry in a wide range of applications: Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) in
online auctions, Hendricks et al. (2003) in outer continental shelf “wildcat” auctions, Li and
Zheng (2009) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) in highway construction procurement
auctions, and Li and Zheng (2012), Li and Zhang (2015), Athey et al. (2011) and others in
timber auctions, to mention just a few. More recently, a smaller literature has developed
exploring empirical properties of the AS model speciﬁcally: notable contributions to this
literature include Marmer et al. (2013), Gentry and Li (2014), Roberts and Sweeting (2013),
and Bhattacharya et al. (2014) explore speciﬁcation testing, nonparametric identiﬁcation,
and empirical applications of the AS model respectively. This study provides a theoretical
counterpart to this recent application-oriented work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the structure of the AS
model, and Section 3 characterizes equilibrium entry and payoﬀs under standard auction
rules. In this section, we will also establish revenue equivalence in the class of auctions
considered. Section 4 establishes that the seller’s optimal auction will in general be ineﬃcient,
and Section 5 explores revenue-maximizing policies explicitly. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Technical proofs are relegated to an online appendix.
2 The Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model
We study an auction of a single indivisible good with endogenous entry. There is one seller
facing N potential bidders who have independent private values for the good being sold. The
seller and all potential bidders are risk-neutral. Timing of the auction game is as follows.
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First, in Stage 1, each potential bidder i observes a private signal si of her (yet unknown)
private value vi, which falls in V = [0, v], and all potential bidders simultaneously choose
whether to enter the auction. Each entering bidder must pay an entry cost c(> 0), which
may be interpreted as the net of opportunity, learning, and bid preparation costs. The
seller may charge an entry fee/subsidy e to each entrant.2 In Stage 2, the n bidders who
chose to enter in Stage 1 learn their true values vi and submit bids for the object being
sold. Auction outcomes (allocation and payments) are determined according to a standard
auction mechanism M , which will be formulated in Deﬁnition 1 and is common knowledge
to all potential bidders. Seller’s value is v0 ∈ V = [0, v].
The value-signal structure and information structure of the Arbitrarily Selective (AS)
entry model are further detailed in the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Each bidder i draws value-signal pairs (Vi, Si) from a joint cumulative
distribution F (v, s) with density f(v, s) satisfying the following properties:
(i) The support of the random variable Vi is a bounded interval V = [0, v], and the joint
density distribution f(v, s) is continuous.
(ii) For each bidder i, the conditional distribution of Vi is stochastically ordered in Si:
s′ ≥ s implies F (v|s′) ≤ F (v|s).
(iii) (Vi, Si) are independent across bidders: (Vi, Si) ⊥ (Vj, Sj) for all j = i.
(iv) Without loss of generality, we normalize ﬁrst-stage signals Si to have a uniform
marginal distribution on [0, 1]: Si ∼ U [0, 1].3
The stochastic ordering condition in Assumption 1(ii) ensures that higher signals are
“good news” in the sense of leading bidders to expect (weakly) stochastically higher distri-
butions of valuations, but otherwise imposes minimal restrictions on the nature of selection.
2A positive (resp. negative) e is interpreted as an entry fee (resp. subsidy).
3If the marginal cumulative distribution function G(·) of Si diﬀers from that of a standard uniform
distribution, one can work on alternative signals S˜i = G(Si), ∀i, which must follow a standard uniform
distribution on [0, 1].
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In particular, the LS model corresponds to the “knife edge” case where Vi ⊥ Si, while the S
model is approached as the limiting case where Si fully determines Vi.
Assumption 2. Information structure:
(i) Each bidder i observes own signal si prior to entry, but does not learn own value vi
until after entry.
(ii) The number of potential bidders N is known to all participants; the number of
entrants n is either hidden until the auction concludes or revealed to all entrants before
their bidding decisions are made.
Assumption 2(ii) ensures that the entrants’ information on entry is symmetric among
themselves, which entails a symmetric monotonic bidding strategy among entrants.
In the spirit of Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994), we frame our
analysis in terms of a general class of mechanisms we call standard auctions:
Deﬁnition 1. A standard auction M is any auction mechanism such that:
1. Mechanism rules are anonymous.
2. If award of the good is made, it is to the entrant submitting the highest bid.
3. The probability of award depends only on the highest bid, the award probability weakly
increases with the highest bid.
4. For any symmetric distribution of values among entrants and any distribution of the
number of entrants, there exists a unique symmetric strictly increasing bidding equi-
librium.
5. An entrant with the lowest value gets non-negative ﬁnite expected payoﬀ πM(0, n) for
each number of entrants (i.e. n); πM(0, n) weakly decreases with n and is independent
of the value distribution of entrants and the distribution of number of entrants.
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This class of standard auctions covers most commonly used mechanisms: in particular,
ﬁrst-price, second-price and all-pay auctions with public or secret reservation prices.
As usual, we frame our analysis in terms of direct mechanisms. By the Revelation
Principle, any mechanism has an equivalent truthful direct mechanism, therefore there is no
loss of generality. By Assumption 2(ii) (information structure) and Deﬁnition 1 (standard
auctions), the good can be awarded only to the entrant with the highest value. Let the
award rule αM(y) denote the probability that mechanism M results in a sale when the
highest (truthfully reported) value among entrants is y. From Deﬁnition 1 (part 3), the
award rule αM(y) is weakly increasing in the maximum entrant value y.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize equilibrium entry behavior and ex ante information rents
in the unique symmetric monotone equilibrium induced by standard auction M . We then
apply these results to extend the classic revenue equivalence theorems of of Myerson (1981),
Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to settings with AS entry.
3.1 Stage 2: Entrant payoﬀ for given entry threshold s¯
Suppose that in Stage 1 each potential bidder chooses to enter if and only if si ≥ s¯. Then
the (selected) cumulative value distribution function of a representative entrant is given by




F (v|s) ds, (1)
where F (v|s) stands for the a potential bidder’s cumulative value distribution function con-
ditional on signal s. F ∗(v; s¯) is stochastically increasing in s¯ by Assumption 1(ii).
By Deﬁnition 1, an entrant i with value v will win against potential bidder j in one of
two events: either j does not enter, or bidder j enters but draws a value less than v. Let
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F ∗w(v; s¯) denote the joint probability of these events:
F ∗w(v; s¯) = s¯+ (1− s¯) · F ∗(v; s¯).
Diﬀerentiating F ∗w(v; s) with respect to s¯ we obtain:
∂
∂s¯
F ∗w(v; s¯) = 1− F (v|s¯) ≥ 0.
Hence the distribution F ∗w(v; s¯) is stochastically decreasing in s¯, a fact we will reference
repeatedly in the derivations below.
The form of the equilibrium bidding function will obviously depend on the payment rule
of the mechanism M , which is not speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 1 as it covers a wide spectrum
of standard auctions. Nevertheless, via standard arguments in mechanism design, we can
characterize an entrant’s expected Stage 2 payoﬀ in any standard auction as follows.
Proposition 1. For a given entry threshold s¯, in any symmetric monotone Stage 2 bidding
equilibrium of any standard auction mechanism M , the expected Stage 2 payoﬀ of an entrant
with value v is given by
πM(v; s¯, N) =
∫ v
0
αM(y) · F ∗w(y; s¯)N−1dy + πM(0; s¯, N), (2)
where πM(0; s¯, N) =
∑N−1
n=0 p(n; s¯, N − 1)πM(0, n + 1) is an entrant’s expected payoﬀ if her
value is 0, in which p(n; s¯, N − 1) = CnN−1(1− s¯)ns¯(N−1)−n is the probability that an entrant
faces n rivals in Stage 2 bidding competition.
Proposition 1 immediately follows Lemma 1 of Myerson (1981), which says that the
derivative of expected payoﬀ of a bidder with respect to their own value is simply the expected
winning probability. In our environment, an entrant with value v wins with probability
αM(y) · F ∗w(y; s¯)N−1 for given entry threshold s¯.
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3.2 Stage 1: Equilibrium entry threshold s∗
Given the Stage 2 payoﬀ πM(v; s¯, N), we next characterize the symmetric Stage 1 equilibrium
entry threshold s∗. Toward this end, consider the Stage 1 decision faced by potential bidder
i with signal si facing N − 1 potential rivals who enter according to s¯. Bidder i’s ex ante
expected Stage 2 payoﬀ if she enters is given by










αM(y) · [1− F (y|si)] · F ∗w(y; s¯)N−1dy + πM(0; s¯, N),
where the second line follows from Proposition 1 and the third follows from integration by
parts. The key properties of this ex ante proﬁt function are stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Given entry threshold s¯ and standard auction M, ex ante expected Stage 2 proﬁt
for an entrant with Stage 1 signal si is
ΠM(si; s¯, N) =
∫ v¯
0
α(y) · [1− F (y|si)] · F ∗w(y; s¯)N−1dy + πM(0; s¯, N). (3)
This function is weakly increasing in si for all (s¯, N), strictly increasing in s¯ for all (si, N),
and strictly decreasing in N for all si and any s¯ < 1.
Bidder i will choose to enter whenever expected net proﬁt from entry is positive:
ΠM(si; s¯, N) ≥ c+ e. (4)
This fact in turn implies a break-even condition which must hold at any candidate interior
equilibrium s∗ ∈ (0, 1):
ΠM(s
∗; s∗, N) ≡ c+ e,
that is, a bidder drawing signal Si = s∗ must be indiﬀerent to entry when potential rivals
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also enter according to s∗. Noting that ΠM(si; s¯, N) is increasing in (si, s¯), we conclude:4
Proposition 2. A symmetric entry equilibrium in the AS model is characterized by a signal
threshold s∗ such that only bidders with si ≥ s∗ choose to enter. This signal threshold is
uniquely determined as follows.
• If ΠM(0; 0, N) > c+ e, then s∗ = 0 and all potential bidders always enter.
• If ΠM(1; 1, N) < c+ e, then s∗ = 1 and no potential bidder ever enters.
• Otherwise, the signal threshold s∗ satisﬁes the break-even condition
ΠM(s
∗; s∗, N) ≡ c+ e, (5)
where ΠM(·; ·, ·) is deﬁned as in Lemma 1.
Furthermore, considered as a function of (N, c + e), the equilibrium threshold s∗N(c + e)
satisﬁes the following monotonicity properties:
• For any N ≥ 1, s∗N(c + e) is continuous and weakly increasing in c + e, with strict
monotonicity whenever s∗N(c+ e) ∈ (0, 1).
• For any c, we have N ′ > N implies s∗N ′(c+ e) ≥ s∗N(c+ e). If in addition s∗N(c+ e) ∈
(0, 1), then s∗N ′(c+ e) > s∗N(c+ e) and s∗N ′(c+ e) ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 2 characterizes the unique symmetric entry equilibrium of the AS model
under any standard auction with simultaneous entry.
4A formal proof is omitted to save space. Please refer to the proof of Proposition 2 of Gentry and Li
(2014) for details. In particular, Assumption 1(i) guarantees continuity of ΠM (s¯; s¯, N) in s¯.
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3.3 Information rent
Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 pin down the information rent of a ﬁrst stage type si(> s∗):
ΔπM(si, s












αM(y) · Fsi(y|si)F ∗w(y; s∗)N−1dy ≥ 0,
which says that the information rent is at least weakly increasing with the ﬁrst stage type
si, with strict inequality if and only if Fsi(y|si) < 0 for some y ∈ [0, v¯].










αM(y) · [F (y|s∗)− F ∗(y; s∗)]F ∗w(y; s∗)N−1dy. (6)
Note that according to (6), bidders’ information rent depends on e and πM(0, n) only
through the entry threshold s∗. It is clear that ΠM(s∗) would be zero if and only if our model
reduces to the “knife edge” case of LS where F (y|s∗) − F ∗(y; s∗) = 0. In Lemma 4, we will
further study how the information rent changes with seller instruments including entry fees
and reservation prices.
3.4 Revenue equivalence
We next extend the seminal revenue equivalence result of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuel-
son (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to accommodate endogenous and selective (AS) entry.
By deﬁnition, for a standard auction M with entry fee/subsidy e inducing equilibrium entry
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s∗, expected seller revenue is the diﬀerence between social welfare and total bidder surplus:
RM(s
∗) = TSM(s∗)−NΠM(s∗),
where TSM(s∗) denotes expected total surplus generated, and ΠM(s∗) is the expected ex ante
equilibrium payoﬀ for any given potential bidder at equilibrium, which we have identiﬁed in
Lemma 2. Note that like bidders’ information rent, social welfare TSM depends on e and
πM(0, n) only through their impacts on the entry threshold s∗.




{yαM(y) + v0(1− αM(y))}d[F ∗w(y; s∗)N ]−N(1− s∗)c.
By Proposition 2, any two mechanisms M1 and M2 having the same award rule and payoﬀ
of the lowest-value type must induce the same equilibrium entry s∗ and information rents
ΠM(s
∗). The conclusion that M1 and M2 are revenue equivalence then follows immediately:
Proposition 3 (Revenue Equivalence). Suppose standard auctions M1 and M2 implement
the same award rule and render the same payoﬀs to the lowest-value type for each ﬁxed n,
and thus that they are revenue equivalent for each ﬁxed n. Then for any entry fee/subsidy e,
M1 and M2 are revenue-equivalent under AS entry.
4 Eﬃciency versus revenue maximization
In this section, we study the relationship between social eﬃciency and revenue maximization
in the class of standard auctions with simultaneous AS entry. We show that a revenue-
maximizing seller will maximize social welfare only in the “knife edge” LS case: otherwise,
the seller will generally prefer an ineﬃcient mechanism. For current purposes, we assume
that the allocation rule is fully described by a public reserve price r ∈ [0, v¯]. In other words,
an entrant with the highest value wins if and only if her value is above r. We focus on two
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policy instruments for the seller: a public reserve price r and an ex ante entry fee/subsidy e.
First consider social welfare. Fix an arbitrary entry threshold s; note that e and πM(0, n)
can be chosen to induce this s without aﬀecting welfare. Then for any r, total welfare is







N ]dy −N(1− s)c, (7)
which is clearly maximized at r = v0 for all s ∈ [0, 1).
Now consider the entry threshold se maximizing TS(s, v0). Rearranging (7) via integra-
tion by parts produces the following equivalent representation for TS(s, v0):




Ndy −N(1− s)c. (8)
This function is concave in s: ∂TS(s,v0)
∂s
= −N ∫ v¯
v0
F ∗w(y; s)
N−1[1 − F (y|s)]dy + Nc, which
decreases with s since F ∗w(y; s) increases and F (y|s) decreases with s. Social welfare is thus





N−1[1− F (y|se)]dy +Nc ≡ 0. (9)
As πM(0, n) does not aﬀect TS(s, r), we set πM(0, n) = 0, ∀n. Then by Proposition 2, se
must be the entry equilibrium when e = 0. We thereby obtain the following proposition,
which generalizes the ﬁndings of Levin and Smith (1994) and Lu (2010) on ex ante eﬃcient
auctions when players must incur information costs to discover their values:
Proposition 4 (Eﬃciency). Within the class of standard auctions with simultaneous entry,
social welfare is maximized in any ex post eﬃcient auction M (which renders πM(0, n) =
0, ∀n) with zero ex ante entry fee.
We next show that in contrast to Levin and Smith (1994), this ex ante eﬃcient auction is
5Without loss of generality, we assume se is an interior solution.
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not revenue maximizing in general. Set πM(0, n) = 0 and r = v0. Now e is the seller’s only
policy choice. Let s∗(e) denote the equilibrium entry threshold. By deﬁnition, seller revenue
is the diﬀerence between social surplus and expected proﬁts among potential bidders, which
with slight abuse of notation we write as follows:
R(e) = TS(s∗(e), v0)−NΠM(s∗(e)).












Recall that when e = 0, ∂TS(s
∗(0),v0)
∂s







When entry is selective, neither dΠM (s
∗(0))
ds
nor s∗′(0) in the RHS of (10) will be zero in general.
Note that an interior s∗ strictly decreases with total entry costs c+ e. The monotonicity of
ΠM with respect to s will be revealed by Lemma 4. Hence the seller’s optimal policy need
not correspond to the social optimum. We state this result formally as a lemma:
Lemma 3. In general, a revenue-maximizing seller does not maximize social welfare.
Intuitively, when potential bidders have no private ex ante information that is correlated
to their ex post values, bidder surplus will be identically zero for all (e, r), so social welfare
and seller revenue coincide and a revenue-maximizing seller will maximize total surplus. In
contrast, when entry is strictly selective, bidder surplus is positive and decreasing in the
entry threshold s∗ as will be revealed by Lemma 4. Therefore, a revenue-maximizing seller
will need to induce distortion to capture part of this additional surplus.
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5 Revenue-maximizing auctions
Finally, we consider revenue-maximizing choices of the seller’s policy variables e and r.
Setting πM(0, n) = 0 as above, observe that we may rewrite both total social welfare TS(s, r)
and potential bidders’ information rent Π(s, r) as functions of s and r as follows:





Π(s, r) = (1− s)
∫ v¯
r
[F (y|s)− F ∗(y; s)]F ∗w(y; s)N−1dy.
The next lemma establishes several useful properties of TS(s, r) and Π(s, r):
Lemma 4. (i) Social welfare TS(s, r) is maximized uniquely at r = v0, ∀s.
(ii) For all r ≥ v0, ∂TS(s,r)∂s ≤ 0.
(iii) Bidder information rent Π(s, r) decreases with r, s.
Recalling that R(s, r) = TS(s, r)−NΠ(s, r). Using the above properties of TS(s, r) and
Π(s, r), in the following proposition, we will establish that a revenue-maximizing seller will
generally set both e and r positive.
Proposition 5 (Optimal entry fee and reserve). The optimal entry fee e∗ must be nonneg-
ative and the optimal reserve r∗ must weakly exceed v0. Furthermore, if entry is strictly
selective in the sense that s′ > s implies F (y|s′) < F (y|s) for some y ∈ [v0, v¯], then the
following statements hold:
(i) If the seller may set both e and r freely, then e∗ > 0 and r∗ > v0;
(ii) If the reserve is constrained eﬃcient (r = v0), then the constrained optimum e∗ > 0;
(iii) If the entry fee is constrained zero (e = 0), then the constrained optimum r∗ > v0.
15
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study auctions with endogenous participation within the general Arbitrarily
Selective (AS) entry model. We allow a broad class of standard auctions in our analysis and
characterize symmetric equilibrium for this class of auctions. We ﬁnd that the classic revenue
equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith
(1994) extend to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We further
show that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both nontrivial reservation prices
and positive entry fees, with revenue maximization inducing eﬃcient entry only in the knife
edge case of nonselective entry. These observations in turn illustrate the importance of
accounting for selection in policy design and welfare analysis.
References
Athey, S., J. Levin, and E. Seira (2011): “Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions:
Evidence from Timber Auctions,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 207 –257.
Bajari, P. and A. Hortacsu (2003): “The Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices, and Endoge-
nous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions,” The RAND Journal of Economics,
34, 329–355.
Bhattacharya, V., J. W. Roberts, and A. Sweeting (2014): “Regulating bidder
participation in auctions,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 45, 675–704.
Bhattacharya, V. and A. Sweeting (2015): “Selective Entry and Auction Design,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 43, 189–207.
Gentry, M. and T. Li (2014): “Identiﬁcation in Auctions with Selective Entry,” Econo-
metrica, 82, 315–344.
Hendricks, K., J. Pinkse, and R. Porter (2003): “Empirical Implications of Equilib-
rium Bidding in First Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions,” Review of Economic
Studies, 70, 115–145.
Krasnokutskaya, E. and K. Seim (2011): “Bid Preference Programs and Participation
in Highway Procurement Auctions,” American Economic Review, 101, 2653–2686.
Levin, D. and J. L. Smith (1994): “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry,” The American
Economic Review, 84, 585–599.
16
Li, T. and B. Zhang (2015): “Aﬃliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Hetero-
geneous Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Eﬀects,” American Economic Journal: Microe-
conomics, 7, 188–214.
Li, T. and X. Zheng (2009): “Entry and Competition Eﬀects in First-Price Auctions:
Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 76, 1397–
1429.
——— (2012): “Information Acquisition and/or Bid Preparation: A Structural Analysis of
Entry and Bidding in Timber Sale Auctions,” Journal of Econometrics, 168, 29–46.
Lu, J. (2010): “Entry Coordination and Auction Design with Private Costs of Information
Acquisition,” Economic Inquiry, 48, 274–289.
Lu, J. and L. Ye (2015): “Optimal Two-stage Auctions with Costly Information Acquisi-
tion,” Working paper.
Marmer, V., A. Shneyerov, and P. Xu (2013): “What Model for Entry in First-Price
Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, 176, 46–58.
McAfee, R. and J. McMillan (1987): “Auctions with entry,” Economics Letters, 23,
343–347.
Moreno, D. and J. Wooders (2011): “Auctions with Heterogeneous Entry Costs,” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 42, 313–336.
Myerson, R. (1981): “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 6,
58–73.
Riley, J. and W. Samuelson (1981): “Optimal Auctions,” American Economic Review,
71, 381–392.
Roberts, J. and A. Sweeting (2013): “When Should Sellers Use Auctions?” American
Economic Review, 103, 1830–1861.
Samuelson, W. F. (1985): “Competitive Bidding with Entry Costs,” Economics Letters,
17, 53–57.
Smith, J. and D. Levin (1996): “Ranking Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 68, 549–561.
Xu, X., D. Levin, and L. Ye (2013): “Auctions with entry and resale,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 79, 92 – 105.
Ye, L. (2007): “Indicative Bidding and a Theory of Two-Stage Auctions,” Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 58, 181–207.
17
